The Allahabad High Court has dismissed an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 filed after a delay of 3,107 days, a period of over 8 years.
A Single Bench of Justice Rajnish Kumar passed this order while hearing an appeal filed by Supreme Transport Company, Lucknow.
The highly belated FAFO under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been preferred against the order dated 01.01.2014 passed in claim petition (Suman Devi Vs M/S Supreme Transport Company and Another) under Section- 165, 166 and Section 140 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 by Motor Accident Claim Tribunal/ District Judge, Lucknow alongwith an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal.
The office has reported a delay of 3107 days in filing the appeal.
The appeal under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 may be preferred within ninety days from the date of award. Second provision to Section 173 provides that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.
Therefore, the Court has to see as to whether the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within time or not.
The Court noted that no ground for condonation of such a long period has been given. Only pleas have been taken that the counsel had never informed about status of claim petition and one Sujauddin was doing pairvi from the side of the appellant and he died four years ago. Who was Sujauddin and why was he doing Pairvi on behalf of the appellant, when the case was contested by the appellant before the tribunal by filing a written statement and the relevant documents on record and husband of appellant were alive, have not been disclosed? Even otherwise, as per own admission of the appellant, the said Sujauddin had died on 21.07.2020 i.e. after more than six years of passing of the impugned judgment and award and since then also more than four years have passed.
Therefore firstly it has not been disclosed as to who Sujauddin was and why he was doing Pairvi. Even if any such person was doing Pairvi, then the plea that the counsel had not informed about the claim petition to the appellant is not tenable.
Secondly, if any such person was doing Pairvi, the Court is unable to comprehend that he would not have told the appellant about the status of claim petition because without instruction and support of the appellant he would not have been doing Pairvi of case.
Even otherwise if the appellant had not tried to know about the status of case for such a long period and even after his death in 2020, the appellant has been thorough negligent in doing Pairvi of case and it cannot be said that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in preferring appeal in time.
The Court further noted that,
Plea of Pardanashin lady was not taken in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay but a plea has been taken in supplementary affidavit without disclosing as to how the appellant is Pardanashin lady. Even otherwise she is the sole proprietor of the appellant transport company as admitted by counsel for the appellant, therefore, it is apparent that the plea has been taken only because the grounds taken by the appellant in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay are not sufficient.
On a query being put as to whether the plea of Pardanashin was taken before the tribunal or not also, counsel for the appellant has not given any reply. However, the impugned judgment and award does not indicate that any such plea was taken before the tribunal, therefore, it is nothing but an afterthought just to get the delay condoned in the appeal.
The Court observed that,
In view of above, the grounds taken by the appellant of such a long delay are not sufficient to condone the delay. A litigant, who is such negligent that he/she would not inquire for the status of case for such a long period in which the allegations are against him/her and he/ she has put in appearance and filed written statement and documents, cannot be said to was prevented from sufficient cause from preferring appeal in time because if he/she has not pursued the case diligently and has been negligent in doing so cannot be said to have been prevented, therefore the grounds taken are nothing but excuses for such a long delay. Such a litigant is not entitled for any discretion of Court.
Therefore no fruitful purpose will be served even by issuing notices to the respondents for calling objection on the application for condonation of delay, when the Court is satisfied that the grounds taken for condonation of delay of such a long period are not sufficient at all.
“In view of above, the delay can be condoned if sufficient ground is shown for condonation of delay. However, as indicated above, on sufficient grounds, the appellant has failed to show even a single ground for condonation of such a long delay of 3107 days and to destroy the right of parties. He has even failed to disclose as to who was the person on whose shoulder he has put the burden of such a long delay even for the period of four years after his death, therefore, the grounds shown by the appellant are nothing but a concocted story to get the delay of such a long period condoned in the matter of accident claim, in which he had contested the case throughout and after affording sufficient opportunity of hearing the tribunal passed the impugned judgment and award.
In view of above and considering the over all facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the appellant has failed to show that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause to file the appeal and only excuses have been given, therefore, the application for condonation of delay is misconceived and liable to be dismissed,” the Court further observed while dismissing the appeal.
The application for condonation of delay is dismissed by the high court.
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